CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified lnformation technology is rapidly advancing, particularly in the Cyber Domain. As our reliance on this technology increases, so too does our vulnerability in terms of national security. This corollary makes it imperative that we develop optimal operational doctrine for lnformation Warfare in the Cyber Domain (IWCD). This paper lays a foundation by defining the terminology associated with lnformation Warfare in the Cyber Domain, reviews the threat and illustrates the vulnerabilities of our information systems, discusses our nation's policies and efforts to wrestle with the growing problem of information securtfy, and traces the subject of information security through our National Security Strategy (NSS), our National Military Strategy (NMS), Department of Defense (DoD) Directives, Joint Vision 2020, and our Joint doctrine.
Information Warfare in the Cyber Domain
lnformation technology is rapidly advancing, particularly in the Cyber Domain. As our reliance on this technology increases, so too does our vulnerability in terms of national security. This corollary makes it imperative that we develop optimal operational doctrine for lnformation Warfare in the Cyber Domain (IWCD). Joint Pub 1-02 defines doctrine as: "Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives."' Although advances in technology continue to change warfare, our national security cannot rest on merely developing and possessing the latest technology.
Technological advancement is only the first step towards ensuring our national security.
Ultimately, it is the human being who determines how to apply the technology to its maximum potential. Man hamesses the doctrine by using the "waysn of imagination, innovation, initiative, and ingenuity, and combining them with the "meansn provided by the technology, to achieve the desired "endn of ensuring our national security. The key is to determine how to gain the greatest advantage of this new potential by developing and applying dhe correct doctrine. Joint Vision 2020 states:
"Materiel superiority [new technology] alone is not sufficient. Of greater importance is the development of doctrine, organizations, training and education, leaders, and people that effectively take advantage of the technology."* We place our national security at risk if our vision is faulty, i.e., if we fail to recognize change; fail to actively learn, adapt, and anticipate; fail to develop the technology; and fail to develop the doctrine necessary to correctly employ technology in light of change.
Historically, combatants who recognized a changing environment, correctly divined the implications and impacts of technological changes, and subsequently developed and applied the correct doctrine, were proven successful on the battlefield. A 20th Century example of failure in this critical dynamic between a changing environment, new technology, and doctrinal development was the Battle of France in the early days of World War 11. It took only a matter of weeks, from the German Airborne assault into The change, the newness, is in the technological means that are being developed. Great advancements have been made in computing power, communications systems, and the global interconnectivity of these systems. When most think about these new technological means, it is in terms of the new capabilities they bring.
However, there is also change and newness in the implications of these capabilities that allow the expansion of our battlespace beyond the domains of land, sea, and aerospace into the cyber domain. Looking back in history, we have used the capabilities of ships and aircraft to take us to the new domains of sea and aerospace. In order to prevail in those battlespaces, we required new doctrinal thinking. It was the new doctrine that harnessed the sea and aerospace technological capabilities, generated sea and aerospace power, allowed our control and unrestricted use of these mediums to achieve our objectives, and thus contributed to the security of our nation. We must now do the same for lnformation Warfare in the Cyber Domain.
Methodolo~y.
The methodology of this paper is to first lay a foundation of background information by defining the terminology associated with lnformation Warfare in the Cyber Domain, reviewing the threat and illustrating the vulnerabilities of our information systems, discussing our nation's policies and efforts to wrestle with the growing problem of information security, and tracing the subject of information security through our National Security Strategy (NSS), our National Military Strategy (NMS), Department of Defense (DoD) Directives, Joint Vision 2020, and our Joint doctrine.
Following the background information, we'll present an example of a possible approach for doctrinal development. This example will be rooted in the nine fundamental principles of war, Air Force doctrine, and three new premises for lnformation Warfare in the Cyber Domain.
Background.
Before we can begin any discussion of information warfare, we need to define the terminology associated with information operations. Joint Pub 3-1 3, Joint Doctrine for lnformation Operations, provides these definitions:= Computer Network Attack:
"Operations to disnrpt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves."
Information Assurance:
"lnformation operations that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation.
This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities."
lnformation Operations:
"Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems."
Information Superiority:
"The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same."
lnformation System:
'The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information."
lnformation Warfare:
"lnformation operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries." Operations ELIGIBLE RECEIVER 97 demonstrated in stark fashion the vulnerability of our systems in the cyber domain, our inability to detect and assess cyber attacks, and the lack of preparation of DoD to wage Information Warfare in the Cyber Domain.
SOLAR SUNRISE was the code name given to a series of intrusions into the DoD systems and networks that occurred 1-26 February 1998. The attacks coincided w i t h U S preparations for potential military action aimed at Iraq over disputes on U.N.
weapons inspections. During this period, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps computers were penetrated and sustained at least 11 attacks worldwide. The perpetrators were found to be two California teenagers and one Israeli teenager. The level of sophistication, the associated affects of the attacks, and the vulnerability of the DoD systems sewed to confirm and reinforce the findings of ER 97.'6.17
In ER 97 and SOLAR SUNRISE, DoD systems were proven to be vulnerable to attacks in the cyber domain. The analysis of these attacks showed that DoD had an ineffective system to detect and assess the cyber attacks and was not organized This report detailed the threat, identiid our vuherabiiities, and provided recommendations for corrective action. The major findings were: there is a general lack of awareness of our vulnerabilities; our infrastructure is currently vulnerable to physical and cyber attack; our vulnerability is exacerbated by extensive and widespread use of information systems, globalization, and deregulation; a public-private partnership is required because of a shared risk environment due to the interdependent nature of infrastructures, but many legal, social, cultural, and economic impediments exist to establishing a partnership necessary to ensure national protection; and current trends wiH impact national and economic security if a protection program is not implemented within a three-to five-year win do^.^^.^^ Subsequent to the PCCIP's report, Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63) was published in May 1998 and built upon the recommendations from the PCCIP's October 1997 report. The PDD 63 communicated the President's intent to swiftly eliminate any significant vulnerability of our infrastructure to physical and cyber attack.24
The preceding sections reviewed the criticality of the threat, the potentially disastrous impact on our national security, our ever-increasing reliance on our information technology and infrastructure both economically and militarily, and our 'We also are committed to maintaining information superiority -the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting and/or denying an adversary's ability to do the In the section on Critical Infrastructure Protection, the NSS unequivocally states:
"Our national security and economic prosperity rest on a foundation of critical infrastructures, including telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems, and emergency services. These infrastructures are vulnerable to computer-generated and physical attacks.
More than any nation, America is dependent on cyberspace. We know that other governments and terrorist groups are creating sophisticated, wellorganized capabilities to launch cyber-attacks against critical American information networks and the infrastructures that depend on them.w27
This same section also reflects our national commitment to develop and possess the capabilrty to fulfill our national security responsibility through the defense of these critical infrastructures. The commitment includes identification and elimination of significant vuhetabilities and creation of systems to detect and respond effectively to these
The NSS clearly states the importance of protecting our critical infrastructures in terms of their linkage to our vital national interests. It emphasizes our current and increasing reliance on the cyber domain, our vulnerability, and our commitment to protecting and mitigating this vulnerability for national security.
Our current National Military Strategy (NMS), dated September 1997, classifies information warfare as a "special concern" under the heading of Asymmetric Joint Pub 3-1 3 does take us to the important first step of promoting a standard of how to think about 10. But as noted previously, the cyber domain can also be viewed as its own battlespace. Previously, our concept of battIespace onty encompassed the domains of ground, sea, and aerospace, but now, has been expanded to include the cyber domain. Like that of the ground, sea, and aerospace, the cyber domain is a battlespace that must be controlled and can be exploited in order to ensure operational freedom of action and the achievement of objectives.
Both the sea and aerospace domains required adaptations to the fundamental principles of war and required development of new principles unique to the pursuit of sea and aerospace control. We have now entered another domain, another battlespace.
Again, as in tfie past, to be successful, combatants must divine the implications and impacts of technological change, and develop and apply fhe correct doctrine. The next section provides, for consideration, a suggested alternative approach for further doctrinal development.
Example of One Possible AP~roach for Further Doctrinal Development
The introductory sections spoke of advances m technology and the relationship to our national security. The question remains as to whether we have developed the doctrine for this new technology that ensures our desired ends (national security). Only the Mure can tell. We must appb thought in an attempt to divine the coned ways (doctrine) to use these new means (technology) to achieve our desired ends. We must continually apply mental energy in order to learn, adapt, and anticipate correctly. The following is provided for general consideration; it is an example of an approach, not the prescribed approach, for further doctrinal development. Ideally, it will serve as food for thought and reflection.
As stated earlier, IWCD departs conceptually from 1 0 and NCW on several points. First, lWCD views cyber superiority (or supremacy) as the essential element or condition to set, sine qua non for operational success. 
Produce a synthesized application of:
Integrate IWCD operations toward accomplishment of clearly defined military and political goals and objectives through their orchestration in time, space, and domains.
IWCD conducts and supports decisive operations across the entire tactical, operational, and strategic spectrum of conflict through speed, combinations of simultaneity and sequencing, and precision. The objective of IWCD is to deny, negate or destroy an adversary's ability and will to fight.
Offensive:
Basic Joint principle:
-...purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
-Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective.
-...the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results.
-Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize the initiative.
-An offensive spirit must therefore be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations.
USAF's articulation: *...forces are best used as an offensive weapon. *...cause the enemy to react rather than act, deny the enemy the offensive, and shape the remainder of the conflict.
Produce a synthesized application of:
Employ IWCD to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative through its inherent offensive capability. The offensive predominates in IWCD. The ubiquitous nature of IWCD causes the opponent to expend resources defending everywhere and reacting while the attacker pursues his objectives through freedom of action. Offensive NVCD is the most effective method to deny an adversary the initiative and freedom of action.
Mass:
-The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the place and time to achieve decisive results.
-To achieve mass is to synchronize appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have [a] decisive effect in a short period of time.
-Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces ... to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.
USAF's articulation: *...to launch an attack from widely dispersed locations and mass combat power at the objective.
*...mass is an effect ... achieve [d] through efficiency of attack.
*... speed, range, and flexibili ty... complemented by the accuracy and lethality of precision weapons.. . achieve mass faster.
Produce a synthesized application of:
Achieve the massed, concentrated effects of IWCD, at the decisive places and times through its capability to launch precise, synchronized, worldwide attacks through distributed operations. MICD employs its inherent speed, flexibility, and versatility during distributed attacks in time, space, and medium to achieve massed, synchronized, and concentrated effects. Mass the effects of IWCD to paralyze, overwhelm, and control an adversary.
Economy of force:
Basic Joint ~rinciple:
-The purpose of economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
-...is the judicious employment and distribution of forces.
USAF's articulation:
*...rational use of force by selecting the best mix of combat power.
*. . . requires clearly articulated objectives and priorities.
*...recommends against "overkill" by guarding against unnecessary force. -The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.
-Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and thus protects the friendly force.
-It contributes materially in exploiting success, preserving freedom of action, and .reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems for the enemy.
USAF's articulation: *...maneuver forces the enemy to react, allows the exploitation of successful friendly operations, and reduces our vulnerabilities.
*...the abilii to integrate a force quickly and to strike directly at an adversary's strategic or operational center of gravity.
*...allows engagement almost anywhere, from any direction, thus forcing the adversary to be on guard everywhere.
*...simultaneous application of mass and maneuver.
Produce a synthesized application of:
Use the ubiquity and speed of NVCD to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic maneuver across time, space, and domain. IWCD maneuver must be governed and measured by its affects on the adversary. That is, use IWCD to keep the adversary at a disadvantage, forced to constantly react to our initiative, remaining constantly off balance, lacking freedom of action, and vulnerable at his most critical points. IWCD maneuver protects our vulnerabilities and directs decisive effects against the adversary's center(s) of gravity.
Unity of Command:
-The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.
-Unijr of effort -coordination through cooperation and common interests -is an essential complement to unity of command.
*...all efforts should be coordinated towards a common objective.
*...must be preserved in order to ensure common focus and mutually supporting actions. 
S e c u~:
-The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire [an] unexpected advantage.
-Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. *...whoever has the best ability to gain, defend, exploit, and attack information, and deny the same capabilities to an opponent has a distinct strategic advantage.
Produce a synthesized application of:
Use WCD to attain and maintain security. Gain cyber supremacy through WCD in order to ensure undisputed control, freedom of adion, and protection of friendly forces from intrusion and attack. Conduct operations to deny the adversary security and sanctuary. The initiative and an offensive orientation must be maintained even.in defensive operations.
Surprise:
Basic Joint ~rinci~le:
-The purpose of surprise is to strike the enemy at a time and place or in a manner for which it is unprepared.
-Factors contributing to surprise include speed of decision-making, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; OPSEC; and variations in tactics and methods of operation.
USAF's articulation: 
Produce a synthesized application of:
Achieve surprise in WCD operations by taking actions at an unexpected time, place, and manner. Degrade and undermine the adversary's ability to resist by generating or reinforcing conditions of shock, disorientation, and confusion. Use the inherent speed, flexibility, and versatility of WCD to seize and maintain the initiative and freedom of action in order to achieve decisive results. Use IWCD to keep an adversary constantly off balance, unsure, and paralyzed.
Simplicity
Basic Joint ~r i n c i~l e :
-The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.
-... minimize misunderstanding and confusion.
-...allows better understanding and execution planning. ..
-Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modem combat ... 
Examples of the Operational Use of Synthesized Principles:
Building upon our nine synthesized principles of war and three new premises of white negating the enemy's abiliity to do the same.
-Achieve domain superiority by aggressive offensive MlCD operations.
Offensive operations are the most effective, efficient, and decisive method to bring about the rapid and decisive achievement of objectives. IWCD operations are intended to destroy, neutralize, disrupt, deceive, deny, degrade, manipulate, or limit the adversary's systems or the information they provide as close to its source as possible and at times and places of our choosing. Offensive operations protect friendly forces and vital interests by destroying or neutralizing the adversary's offensive capabilities before they can be employed against us.
-Establish and maintain the desired degree of cyber superiority by executing focused, orchestrated, and synchronized decisive IWCD operations in order to destroy or neutralize the adversary's forces and capabilities. IWCD operations best achieve optimal effects and effectiveness through centralized control and decentralized execution. The intent of these operations is to enable our unrestricted use of otherwise contested cyberspace and to disable the adversary's offensive cyber capabilities in order to secure friendly forces from threats or actual attacks and to achieve our objectives.
Achieve strategic objectives by directing NVCD operations with the intent of directty affecting the adversary's center of gravity (COG). Correctly determined, a COG should represent the source(s) from which the enemy derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. ldealfy, a successful NVCD operation against an adversary's COG would rapidly achieve a decisive effect upon the adversary thus securing our strategic goals while avoiding unnecessary loss of life and national treasure.
-Direct NVCD operations towards gaining and maintaining freedom of action and protection of friendly forces. IWCD may include such operational missions as interdiction (i.e., diversion, disruption, delaying, interception, andlor destruction of enemy information before it can be used), suppression, jamming, blockage, canalization, deception, denial, and degradation. Some of the desired effects of NVCD on the adversary are: systemic failures, physical and psychological paralysis, confusion, defeat of an adversary's plans, infliction of unacceptable losses on attacking forces and capabilities, dissolution of unity, and capitulation. Cause the rapid termination of conflict by eliminating the adversary's will and ability to continue to fight.
Seize and maintain the initiative in defensive IWCD operations by preemptively defeating the adversary's offensive plan and neutralizing his ability to attack our vulnerabilities or exercise freedom of action. These operations consist of adive and passive measures to reduce vulnerability and increase survivability of friendly forces and the information they provide. Defensive IWCD operations are intended to defend friendly forces and their cyber space, material, and infrastructure from attack. Specific missions are detection, identification, interception, interdiction, and preemptive, preparatory, and counter strikes. Additional tasks may include designing survivability features into systems and information architecture, satellite maneuver, tracking, emission control, and deception.
The preceding serve only as examples. They are adaptations from the doctrine associated with the basic USAF functions listed above. They are rooted in the principles of war and the three underlying premises that establishment of cyber supremacy is essential for success, IWCD can be the weapon of choice, and NVCD can itself bring about conflict resolution. These examples represent taking existing thought, critically analyzing the implications of a changing environment, and then adapting, changing, or developing thought with the goal of deriving *e correct doctrine for the new environment.
Summation.
We started with the premise that Information technology, particularly in the cyber domain, is rapidly advancing. As our reliance on this technology increases, so too does our vulnerability in terms of national security. In the preceding sections we have seen the linkage to our nation interests and survival, the nature of the threat and our vulnerability, and the thought thus far in policy, guidance, vision and doctrine.
Recognizing this situation, we derived the corollary that it is imperative to continue the development of operational doctrine for lnformation Warfare in the Cyber Domain.
The advancements in computing power, telecommunications systems, and the global interconnectivity of these systems require basic changes in the treatment and approach to lnformation Warfare and its new battlespace -the cyber domain. As a step towards this goal, we looked at a new paradigm for the principles of war given three premises: I) establishment of cyber supremacy is essential for operational success, 2)
MICD can be the weapon of choice for future decision-makers, and 3) WCD can itself bring about conflict resolution in certain situations. Next, we looked at a possible approach to doctrinal development that took the nine principles of war, integrated the USAFs doctrinal interpretation of each principle and synthesized them into principles for NVCD. Finafty, we looked at some examples of how to employ the synthesized principles and three new premises of MlCD in operational doctrine.
Doctrinal development must be made a top priority. This paper presented an example of a possible approach to further doctrinal development using the nine principles of war as a framework. There are many other methods. The intent is to spur further thought and progress towards developing the correct doctrine for our nation.
New approaches, paradigms, and doctrine are required to allow our control and unrestricted use of this new medium in order to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives and ultimately ensure our national security.
If we are to fight and win in the battlespace envisioned by JV 2020, we must act decisively in order to achieve and ensure our superiority in terms of lnformation Warfare in the Cyber Domain. We must develop Joint and Senrice doctrine that keeps pace with technological advancement in order to harness NVCD's capability and guard against its use by an adversary. IWCD should not be an afterthought or add-on to doctrine.
Change is upon us, but our responsibilities for national security remain constant.
We must develop the necessary concepts and doctrine for the new technology in order to fulfill our responsibilities.
"Even as we adjust to face a changed security environment, our goals remain firm: We must protect America's interest. We must deter aggression. We must support the peaceful resolution of disputes, and most important, we must be ready to intervene or respond to a conflict and win decisively . 
